



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

were elaborated, as the author evidently thinks, than the character of these bodies made necessary.

The book, as will be evident from the few points singled out for notice, is of interest not to lawyers alone, but to all students of institutional history. Its usefulness is increased by a careful index.

MUNROE SMITH.

L'Idée de l'État. Essai Critique sur l'Histoire des Théories Sociales et Politiques en France depuis la Révolution. Par HENRY MICHEL. Paris, Hachette & Cie., 1896. — vii, 659 pp.

The content of this very substantial volume is not clearly indicated by either the chief or the secondary title. There is no set treatment of the general theory of the state, nor is the history of social and political theories presented in a comprehensive form. It would be fairly exact to describe the work as a history of individualism in French political theory since 1700. M. Michel conceives that the individualistic dogma was the most characteristic principle of Revolutionary theory; that the modification of, and reaction against, this dogma have been the most conspicuous features of social and political philosophy since the Revolution; and that accordingly it is not inaccurate to employ the most general terms in designating his essay in this particular field. Possibly, too, a shrewd and entirely justifiable desire to differentiate his book from the never-ending swarm of publications on individualism and socialism has influenced him in excluding both these overworked terms from the title.

For the task that he undertook M. Michel shows himself to have been well fitted. He has read widely, and he shows admirable powers of both analysis and synthesis. Though he has a thesis to establish, he is a model of impartiality in his examination of all theories, whether favorable or adverse to his own. His taste has led him to treat exclusively of the development of ideas, but he expressly concedes the importance of a thorough acquaintance with the facts of objective history as a basis and a corrective for our judgment on the course of philosophic thought.

In his "Introduction" M. Michel sketches the various systems of political and social theory in the eighteenth century which, starting from different points, converged just before the Revolution into "*la thèse individualiste*." Voltaire, the Encyclopedists and the Physiocrats, he points out, tended only to qualify the idea of the "adminis-

trative monarchy" of Louis XIV by insisting that the despotism of the state should be directed to certain desirable ends. Freedom of thought, general happiness, freedom of commerce — these ends respectively should be promoted by the state, not, however, as rights of the people, but for the benefit of the state. On the other hand, in the writings of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Condorcet in France, and of Kant, Fichte and Adam Smith elsewhere, appears the idea of the man as man, with rights that the state is bound to respect. This idea, formulated with distinctness by the American colonists at the time of their separation from England, became the dominant principle of the French Revolution. But the author very acutely points out that in the minds of the individualists of the eighteenth century there was no conception of a profound antagonism between the man and the state ; that was a later notion. The triumph of democratic equality in the Revolution, bringing governmental power into the hands of the masses, increased rather than diminished the scope commonly assigned to state activity. The state was to be the all-powerful agent for promoting the welfare and interest of the individual. Not the paternal care of the "enlightened despotism," but the rational consciousness of his own good on the part of each individual, was conceived to be the underlying principle of state action.

After thus determining the character of the Revolutionary individualism, the author proceeds to examine the reaction which set in against it. In the theocratic school of Bonald and Maistre, in the utilitarianism of Bentham, in the historical thought of Burke and Savigny and in the abstractions of Hegel, he finds a common element, though rather opposing than contradicting the individualistic thesis. The ultimate principle in each of these systems is a conception of the state as an entity essentially independent of the individual. Their philosophy tends not so much to antagonize as to ignore the individual, and to busy itself solely with the state, conceived as determined not by the human will, but by God or by custom or by law or by history or by the Absolute. This book of M. Michel's work is perhaps the cleverest of all. There is required, if not great genius, certainly great ingenuity to make Bentham fit into the same class with Burke and Hegel, but M. Michel shows himself equal to the task.

It is in the economic and social reaction against individualism, which is treated in Book II, that a clearly defined contradiction of the Revolutionary doctrine begins to appear. In the St. Simonians

and in Louis Blanc are found the beginnings of socialism. The industrial revolution having brought in its train misery to the working classes, various devices for the removal of this evil are brought forward. Sismondi and the dissident economists insist on positive action by the existing state in the sphere of morals; Louis Blanc calls for state guarantee of the right to labor; while the St. Simonians propose the radical readjustment of existing economic institutions and the establishment of an associational theocracy. But the tendencies of these various lines of thought are accompanied by a pronounced recrudescence of individualism. Now appears, for the first time, the idea of an absolute opposition between the individual and the state. In the exclusion of the state from positive action either for or against the interests of the private man lies the essence of the individualistic argument. The orthodox economists insist that government keep its hands off from industry and commerce: the political scientists of the Doctrinaire and Liberal schools resent the intrusion of the state in projects for social and moral improvement. It does not escape the author that the net result of this *laissez-faire* individualism was to consecrate all existing inequalities among men — that it was the philosophic expression of the *bourgeois régime*. The state was to be merely an instrument for the maintenance of fair play between struggling individuals and groups of individuals, but the instrument was to be wielded by those who had been successful. In this form, individualism had become unfaithful to its origins: "starting in the recognition of equal rights of all orders, it ends in the justification of privilege."

In the recent decline of this anti-state individualism, M. Michel ascribes the chief influence in France to the development of sociology under the impulse of Comte. For scientific socialism, the influence of which has also been important, he has to examine the works of foreign writers, confessing that France has not produced in that field any complete system. The essential principle of the sociological movement is the conception of society as a living organism, endowed with a functional activity quite independent of the individual. As Bonald set above man the state founded in theological mystery, and as Hegel enveloped the state in metaphysical mystery, so Comte involves society in a materialistic mystery. The net result in each case is the same: "the individual withers," and the life and functions and powers of the mass assume the chief importance. To this tendency a very decided impetus is given by

the scientific socialists, who, in contributing to the modification of economic theory, have thrown into a strong light the weaknesses of the individualistic dogma in its larger aspects.

The present condition of French philosophy in the field where M. Michel works is, he thinks, one of general incoherence and confusion. Before the assaults of its adversaries individualism has lost ground, and is groping about rather blindly for some secure foothold. At the same time a large measure of eclecticism has characterized recent thought. This fact he illustrates by showing the existence of individualistic and socialistic principles side by side in the writings of Le Play, Taine, Renan and others. Out of the decay of a clean-cut individualism, however, the growth of a well-defined state socialism is very manifest. Against this development M. Michel is moved, in conclusion, to seek for some efficient means of philosophic opposition. Only here at the end of his work does he reveal his confidence in the individualistic thesis, and make his suggestions for its maintenance. The line of action has been indicated, he holds, by M. Renouvier, for whose work he manifests a high appreciation. It must first be admitted that, with all the variations in which the doctrine of individualism, as well as that which opposes it, has appeared, the essential philosophic antithesis between the two is that between realism and necessity on the one hand and idealism and liberty on the other. Man is conceived of either as the creature of some abstract, but real entity, — humanity, society, the social organism, — or as working in entire freedom through his own volition toward an ideal perfection. Of these two antipodal conceptions only the latter is reconcilable with any logical system of general philosophy, or with the conceptions of human dignity, of right, of popular sovereignty and of political liberty ; hence the latter — the philosophy of liberty — must be accepted. This brings us back at once to the eighteenth-century individualism, from which later writers have deviated. Assuming liberty, justice must be defined ; and this, the author concludes, consists in the will and in the effort to assure to every moral personality the right to live and to rise through culture. Liberty and justice, thus rationally determined, are the ends of the state. The means to the attainment of these ends are to be determined empirically. It has been a source of much confusion in political philosophy that theorists have determined ends empirically and means *a priori*. The scope of the two methods must be clearly distinguished. On the basis of these distinctions, his conclusion is that the state has duties toward the

individual; but rights cannot be assigned to it. Its function in respect to the individual is to assist, not to constrain, the development of his personality. This is where the author's view is held to differ from that of the socialists. From that of the orthodox economists it differs in not accepting competition among individuals as the primary or exclusive agency in their development, or limiting state action to the palliation of the evils incidental thereto.

It is not likely that M. Michel's solution will end the long controversy over the problem of individual *versus* state; but there is no room to doubt that his work is a most valuable and suggestive contribution not only to the history of doctrine in France, but to the understanding of a far-reaching problem that is prominent in every civilized land.

WM. A. DUNNING.

La Enseñanza de la Historia. By RAFAEL ALTAMIRA, Secretario del Museo Pedagógico Nacional. Madrid, Victoriano Suárez, 1895. — xii, 475 pp.

The author of this excellent and very useful work is already known to the scientific world by his history of communal property, which J. H. Round said should "be secured by every student of this fascinating subject." Altamira is one of that group of men whose object is to rouse Spain out of its scientific lethargy. In 1891 he put forth a work on the teaching of history; but as it circulated only privately, most students were restricted to Mr. Armstrong's account¹ of it for a knowledge of the author's views. Owing to the cordial reception of this work, Altamira determined to offer it to the world at large; and, while doing so, he revised and enlarged it, thus virtually producing a new book.

Though the purpose of the book is purely pedagogic, it is conceived on so broad a plan that, apart from its pedagogic doctrines, it has many other valuable features. The object of Altamira is to review the methods of teaching history that are in vogue in the various civilized countries, and then to see if these methods are in conformity with the best ideals, as elaborately worked out by him. Thus the work opens with a descriptive account of the methods employed in France, in Germany, in England and in the United States. Only a few words are devoted to Belgium, Holland and Italy. About Russian and Austrian methods we learn nothing, while Spanish problems are reserved for careful treatment in the final chapter.

¹ *English Historical Review*, VII, 808, 809.